Author: Marta Ramat
Committee: Academic Committee
Data: 26/03/2026
After the first two seminal rulings in G.K and Others (C-281/22) and EPPO (C-292/23) – both synthesised on this blog here and here – the ECJ has recently been seized of three new preliminary references on the interpretation of the Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 (EPPO Regulation). These three cases will give the Court the opportunity to rule on three novel issues, all of key importance for the smooth functioning of the EPPO as well as for its accountability.
The first referral, in case Tersten (C-407/25), arises from criminal proceedings before the Belgian courts and concerns the communication and division of competences between the EPPO and national bodies. In particular, in the case at hand, the Belgian customs authority had charged several defendants with offences falling within the jurisdiction of the EPPO, namely, various forms of false customs declarations. On 1 June 2021, when the EPPO began operating, the investigations were at an advanced stage but had not yet been completed. This notwithstanding, it does not appear that the EPPO was ever informed of the proceedings in progress, information which would have been necessary for it to decide whether to take over the case.
Against this backdrop, the referring court asks the CJEU to interpret Articles 24, 25, 27 and 35 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 and asks whether, in circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, those provisions prevent the competent national authorities from retaining their competence or requires the referring court to transfer the case back to national authorities in order for them to communicate it to the EPPO thus allowing the latter to decide on evocation.
The second case, registered as Raukar-Gamulin (C-506/25), was referred by the Croatian Constitutional Court and concerns the designation of the national authority competent to rule on conflicts of jurisdiction between the EPPO and national authorities.
Pursuant to Article 25(6) of the EPPO Regulation, it is for Member States to designate the national authority competent to rule on those conflicts of jurisdiction; however, the CJEU has indirect jurisdiction to rule on those conflicts if called to interpret the Regulation’s provisions on jurisdiction. It would thus be reasonable to infer that Member States should designate a national authority that qualifies as a ‘national court or tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 267 TFEU.
This does not seem to be the case in Croatian Law, where the competent authority is the Prosecutor General.
That is why, by its four questions, the referring court essentially asks the CJEU if the appointment of that body is compatible with Articles 6(1), 25(6) and 42(2)(c) of the Regulation.
This case is particularly significant since not only Croatia, but also the vast majority of Member States, have designated an organ of the public prosecution service as the competent authority: this problem was ascertained by a compliance assessment (p. 55-58) and affects, inter alia, Italy (p. 27-28). Depending on what the CJEU will decide, either a public prosecutor will be considered – for the first time and in this specific context – as a ‘national court or tribunal’, or many Member States will have to amend their legislation in orfer to comply with the Court’s ruling.
Finally, in Aliki (C-686/25), the Greek Special Court for Actions against Judges seized the CJEU with questions concerning jurisdiction on EDPs’ non contractual liability.
In particular, the main proceedings were initiated as an action for damages brought by the suspect against two defendants: the competent EDP and the national investigating judge.
Since, pursuant to Articles 42(4) and 113(3)-(5) of the EPPO Regulation, the non-contractual liability of the EPPO for conduct of an EDP should fall within the jurisdiction of the CJEU, the Greek judges have doubts on their own jurisdiction to hear the claim against the Greek EDP in question.
While the Commission might soon propose some amendments to the EPPO Regulation, under Article 119 therein, and scholarly discussions are already ongoing in that regard, these three new preliminary rulings allow the CJEU to provide some essential clarification and to elaborate on the rationale behind key provisions for the EPPO’s functioning.