Authors: Miriam Testa, Gaia Marazzi
Committee: Eu institutions Committee
Date: 12/03/2026
Introduction
The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) is, within its mandate, the guardian not only of the financial interests of the European Union, but also of the rule of law within the European Union.
The philosophy expressed by European Chief Prosecutor, Laura Kövesi, regarding the mission of the Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) deserves particular attention. According to Kövesi, the EPPO should not be assessed merely as a profitable investment – even though it is often considered as such, given that the amounts seized largely exceed its operational costs.[1] Rather, it embodies a broader vision: an institution aimed at ensuring that European Union is governed by the rule of law rather than by a purely economic rationale.
Its primary objective is the dismantling of criminal organizations and the prosecution of those responsible. Equally important is the need to preserve and strengthen citizens’ trust in the European Judicial system.[2]
To provide a more concrete perspective, reference can be made to the consolidated data as of 31 December 2025, which show that the EPPO had firmly established itself as a central pillar of European Union’s anti-fraud architecture. According to these data, the Office handled more than 3,000 ongoing investigations, involving an estimated damage exceeding € 67.27 billion.[3]
Against this background, cooperation with the institutions, bodies and agencies of the European Union remains a crucial and challenging aspect of the EPPO’s institutional framework.
The problem of corruption
From the first debates on the need for a European Public Prosecutor’s Office, one of the most pressing needs was to combat phenomena such as corruption.
Corruption is the abuse of power for private gain; it manifested in the context of public procurement through specific criminal conduct.[4] It is normatively defined as a deliberate act in which a public official – directly or through an intermediary – requests or receives advantages, or situation in which a private subject promises or offers advantages. These are referred to respectively as passive and active corruption.5
This phenomenon leads to the violation of official duties to the detriment of the financial interests of the Community. For this reason, corruption, in all its forms -both as a principal offence and as incitement to the conduct in question – must be punished.6 Represents a systemic threat since the public procurement sector, which accounts for 12% of GDP in OECD countries, is inherently vulnerable, both due to the value of the financial interests at stake and the volume of transactions, but also because of the close relationship between public officials and businesses, and the multitude of stakeholders.[5] The report under examination shows that approximately 5% of EPPO investigations concern both active and passive corruption of public officials, at both national and European level, is rarely an isolated offence, as it almost always operates in combination with fraud schemes on expenditure or revenue.[6] The investigation analyzed in this paper perfectly embodies this dynamic: public officials who, by manipulating a public tender, favored a specific entity.
THE CASE OF POLAND: between administrative oversight and criminal action Before examining the specific case, it is useful to briefly outline Poland’s participation in the European Public Prosecutor’s Office.
In accordance with Article 331(1) TFEU and Article 120 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, Poland notified its intention to join the EPPO on 5 January 2024. The participation was confirmed by a Commission Decision of 29 February 2024, making Poland the twenty-third Member State involved in the enhanced cooperation. The EPPO started its operations in Poland at the end of January 2025, and, for this Member States, its temporal competence starts as of 1 June 2021.
The investigative activity of 2025 highlights the crucial role of the EPPO in prosecuting serious crimes in Poland. A paradigmatic example of how the collaboration between the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the EPPO can expose the misuse of public funds in the Nowy Sacz investigation.
The inquiry was launched in October 2025, concerning a suspected abuse of power and misappropriation involving public officials. It is believed that between October and November 2024, public officials of the Polish city of Nowy Sacz manipulated a public tender in order to favor a interests of the Community and the establishment of a European Prosecutor. COM (2001) SS 5.2.1.2 5 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive, COM (2012), Art. 4(1); cf. Protocol of 27 September1996 6 European Commission, 2012, art. 2
regional development agency, disclosing to it confidential budget information of the contracting administration, thus allowing it to submit bids corresponding to the available funding, thereby winning the public tender through an undue advantage.[7]
In October 2025, at the request of the EPPO, the central Anti-Corruption Office (CBA) carried out searches at the municipality of Nowy Sacz, with the aim of obtaining evidence related to an EUfunded public procurement procedure.10
This case represents an emblematic example, as it originated from an initial report submitted to OLAF, which subsequently referred the matter to the EPPO, demonstrating an effective flow of information between the administrative and criminal dimensions of EU anti-fraud enforcement. From this perspective, the institutional cooperation between OLAF and the EPPO represents a key strength, demonstrating that the EU anti-fraud architecture functions effectively when administrative oversight and criminal prosecution operate in coordination.
The European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the European Anti-Fraud Office: cooperation in investigations
The Poland’s case highlighted the importance of the cooperation in investigations between authorities. Indeed, the investigations into suspected abuse of power in EU-funded project carried out by the EPPO were initiated because of the submission report of the OLAF.
This was one of the cases in which cooperation was essential for the protection of the European budget.
Improved cooperation and efficiency among EU institutions are grounded in Article 325 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The first paragraph states: “The Union and the Member States shall counter fraud and any other illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the Union through measures to be taken in accordance with this Article, which shall act as a deterrent and be such as to afford effective protection in the Member States, and in all the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies.”
The cooperation between the two institutions is the result of an institutional and legal evolution that lasted more than twenty years. This long process first led to the establishment of an administrative Office independent from the European Commission, with the intent of replacing the Unité de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Fraude (UCLAF)[8]; and later to the creation of a European body whose purpose was to apply European criminal law in order to combat frauds against the EU financial interests[9].
OLAF was established by the Regulation n. 1073/1999, then implemented by the Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No. 883/2013 (hereinafter “the OLAF Regulation”). The idea of creating an independent criminal body emerged during the same period. In the early stages of discussion regarding the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor, the operational activities of the OLAF in its investigation and preventive actions were widely debated. This need arose from the intention to overcome specific gaps within the operations of the Anti-Fraud Office, particularly the lack of access to typical criminal investigative measures. These included, for instance, the request for house searches or conduct witnesses’ hearings. These limitations were highlighted in the Green Paper “on criminallaw protection of the financial interests of the Community and the establishment of a European Prosecutor” published in 2001, which also considered the need to coordinate the criminal and antifraud Offices, in order to avoid duplication of investigations[10].
Thus, the objective was to reconsider the role and the functions of the OLAF in light of the possible creation of a new criminal body. However, the project of the establishment of the EPPO remained only a proposal for another sixteen years.
A turning point came with the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Article 86 of the Treaty introduced the possibility of establishing a European Public Prosecutor’s Office
This was only the beginning of the process. The EPPO was officially established in 2017 through Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 (hereinafter “the EPPO Regulation”) and became operational the 1st of June 2001.
However, the EPPO became operational within an already existing institutional framework, which needed to be coordinated. Based on principle of sincere cooperation, as stated in recital 69 of the preamble of the EPPO Regulation, the National Authorities and European institutions, bodies, agencies and offices, including OLAF, should support e cooperate with the EPPO during the investigations. Conversely, the EPPO expected to cooperate closely with the European and National authorities.
These general principles contained in the Preamble and in the Article 99 are further specified in Article 101 of the EPPO Regulation, which states that “The EPPO shall establish and maintain a close relationship with OLAF based on mutual cooperation within their respective mandates and on information exchange”.
Is it therefore useful to examine the legal framework governing the relationship between EPPO and OLAF (referred to as “the Parties”).
Based on the principle of non-duplication of investigations, the two Offices must cooperate on respect of their respective mandates. OLAF can independently initiate administrative investigations; however, it should refrain from doing so if there are ongoing EPPO investigations on the same case[11]. Even when the OLAF operates autonomously, it should inform the EPPO[12]. On the contrary, the EPPO should provide all the relevant information in order to facilitate the Anti-Fraud Office’s investigations[13].
The same principles are reflected in the OLAF Regulation, that reiterates the principle of sincere cooperation between the two Offices, the principle of non-duplication of the investigations, and the obligation to inform the EPPO on ongoing investigations.
The provisions contained in the two Regulations served as legal basis for the Working Arrangements between OLAF and EPPO. Indeed, pursuant to Article 1.4(a) and 12.g of the OLAF Regulation and Article 101.1 of the EPPO Regulation, the need to formalize cooperation through a Working Arrangement was recognized. The purpose of the Working Arrangement, signed in Luxembrug on the 5th of July 2021, is to establish cooperation between the Parties while respecting the criminal and administrative mandates (Art. 1). Its scope of application is defined in Article 3 and includes activities such as the exchange of information, support in investigations, and communication with the media. The cooperation is intended to be reciprocal; indeed, Article 6 of the Working Arrangements considers the support of the EPPO to the OLAF and vice versa.
This was the scheme applied in the Poland case[14]. Under Article 12c of the OLAF Regulation, the administrative Office is required to report any potential criminal conduct to the EPPO.
TRANSNATIONAL VAT FRAUD: the Moby Dick case
Within the boarder framework of protecting the financial interests of the Union, Cross-border VAT fraud represents one of the most significant and costly threats. It accounts for more than two thirds of the estimated economic damage reported by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. These
phenomena are often described as genuine “criminal ecosystem”, which exploit digitalization and complex financial mechanisms to launder illicit profits. Recent cases such as the investigations “Moby Dick” and “Fuel Family” illustrate how criminal organizations rely on shell companies to divert millions of euros from public funds, thereby undermining the proper functioning of the internal market.[15] It is precisely the transnational dimension of these criminal activities than makes the intervention of the EPPO necessary. The Moby Dick investigation is cited by Chief Prosecutor as a prime example of the EPPO’s effectiveness in countering major transnational organized crime. The criminal organization involved is suspected of orchestrating VAT fraud worth over €520 million. Between 2020 and 2023, it issued invoices for electronic products (AirPods, laptops) worth over €1.3billion.[16]
Conclusion
The complex schemes in the cross-border and VAT fraud system emphasize the role of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and the importance of coordination with other institutions, particularly OLAF, in order to maximize its efficiency. However, the existing Working Arrangements do not always keep pace with the evolving realities and needs that have emerged in the recent years.
In this regard, several proposals have been put forward to implement the cooperative structure. In November 2025, a proposal was made by the Secretary-General of the European Commission on strengthening the cooperation between EPPO, OLAF and Eurofisc to combat frauds[17]. The proposal has been introduced after the concerning data emerged in the Annual Reports of the EPPO, OLAF and Eurofisc, especially in regard to the Missing Trader Intra-Community (MTIC) fraud21. As highlighted in the proposal, in 2023 alone, this type of criminal operation caused between EUR 12.5 and UR 32.8 billion estimated damages.
As previously discussed, the EPPO-OLAF cooperation is based on bilateral mechanism. However, considering the impact and the complexity of transnational frauds, it is necessary to adapt a perspective beyond mere dualism. A coordinated and multilateral action is required in order to combat this phenomenon. Particularly, the proposal aims to allow Eurofisc to share relevant information to combat transnational crimes with the EPPO and OLAF. Member States should also guarantee centralized access for both Offices to relevant information, mainly through the use of EU IT system.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), Annual Report 2025. Publications Office of the European Union
Commission of the European Communities. Green Paper on the criminal-law protection of the financial interests of the Community and the establishment of a European Prosecutor. COM (2001) SS 5.2.1.2
European Commission, Proposal for a Directive, COM (2012), Art. 4(1); cf. Protocol of 27 September1996
OECD. (2016). “Preventing corruption in public procurement”. OECD Publishing.
EPPO, “Poland: Searches in investigation into suspected abuse of power in EU-funded project”, 9 October 2025.
Communicate EPPO of October 2025
C. Stefanou, S. White, H. Xanthaki, “OLAF at the Crossroads: Action against EU Fraud” (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011).
Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, “implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office”.
Working Arrangement between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the European Anti-Fraud Office, “Exchange of information”.
European Public Prosecutor’s Office, ‘Investigation “Moby Dick”: Eleven arrests in €520 million VAT fraud investigation” (Press release, 25 June 2025).
European Commission, “Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION amending Regulation (EU) No 904/2010 as regards the access of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to value added tax information at Union level”, COM (2024), 685 final
[1] European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), Annual Report 2025. Publications Office of the European Union.
[2] Kövesi, L. (2026). Foreword in European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), Annual Report 2025
[3] EPPO, Annual Report 2025
[4] Commission of the European Communities. Green Paper on the criminal-law protection of the financial
[5] OECD. (2016). “Preventing corruption in public procurement”. OECD Publishing.
[6] EPPO, Annual Report 2025
[7] EPPO, “Poland: Searches in investigation into suspected abuse of power in EU-funded project”, 9 October 2025 10 Communicate EPPO of October 2025
[8] C. Stefanou, S. White, H. Xanthaki, “OLAF at the Crossroads: Action against EU Fraud” (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011), pp. 19-28
[9] Ibidem
[10] European Commission, “Green Paper on criminal-law protection of the financial interests of the Community and the establishment of a European Prosecutor”, COM (2001) 715 final.
[11] Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, “implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office”, paragraph 103.
[12] Working Arrangement between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the European Anti-Fraud Office, “Exchange of information”, Art. 4
[13] Ibidem.
[14] EPPO, Annual Report 2025
[15] EPPO, Annual Report 2025
[16] European Public Prosecutor’s Office, ‘Investigation “Moby Dick”: Eleven arrests in €520 million VAT fraud investigation” (Press release, 25 June 2025)
[17] European Commission, “Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION amending Regulation (EU) No 904/2010 as regards the access of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to value added tax information at Union level”, COM (2024), 685 final 21 Ibidem